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Abstract
We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a two-country trade
model characterized by monopolistic competition and international ﬁrm and
capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country aﬀect foreign welfare
through the relocation of mobile ﬁrms and through changes in the rents ac-
cruing to capital owners. With consumption-based taxation, these ﬁscal ex-
ternalities exactly oﬀset each other and the non-cooperative tax equilibrium
is Pareto eﬃcient. With production-based taxation, however, there are addi-
tional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level which
lead non-cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto eﬃcient levels.
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11 Introduction
During the last two decades, the ﬁscal importance of commodity taxes has increased
considerably as many OECD countries have adjusted commodity tax rates upward
in order to make up for revenue losses caused by income tax reforms. These reforms
have emphasized the importance of maintaining national autonomy over the rates of
general commodity taxation in order to balance the government budget. This is true
even in the European Union (EU), where a minimum value-added tax (VAT) rate of
15% has been introduced, but further VAT harmonization meets serious opposition
from most EU member states.1
National autonomy over commodity tax rates raises, however, the possibility that
these taxes are used strategically and tax competition results. For this reason the
discussion has also stressed the importance of adopting an international tax regime
that minimizes the incentives to pursue such beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The is-
sue of choosing a tax principle that maximizes world welfare when countries behave
non-cooperatively has been addressed in the literature mostly in a setting of perfect
competition and commodity trade only. In the present paper we extend this frame-
work by considering monopolistic competition and international ﬁrm mobility, thus
linking our analysis to recent work in the international trade literature.
In principle, international commodity trade can be taxed either in the country of
consumption (destination principle) or in the country of production (origin princi-
ple). Under the destination principle goods leave the exporting country free of tax,
whereas under the origin principle commodities are traded at tax-inclusive prices.
Historically, world trade has been taxed under the destination principle and this
is still true for the large majority of international transactions today. Two recent
developments have, however, begun to undermine the general applicability of this
tax scheme. First, regional integration of national markets creates increasing pos-
sibilities for consumers to shop in neighbouring jurisdictions, at the tax rates of
the exporting country. This issue has been of central importance in the EU, where
border controls between member states have been abolished. Cross-border shopping
is also of concern at the U.S.-Canadian border and its role is likely to increase in
1At present, the EU’s minimum VAT rate is binding only for Luxembourg.
1other parts of the world as regional integration proceeds. Second – and perhaps even
more important – is the growth of remote sales through mail-ordering and electronic
commerce, which oﬀers new possibilities for consumers to engage in tax arbitrage.2
It is clearly recognized both in the European Union and in North America, however,
that enforcing destination-based taxes on these purchases entails severe compliance
costs for the businesses involved (Keen and Smith 1996, Mikesell 2000). Given these
practical shortcomings, the case for the destination principle has been reconsidered
in recent years and it has been asked whether the theoretical arguments for this tax
scheme vis-a-vis the competing origin principle are suﬃciently strong and robust to
warrant the additional administrative costs involved.
The choice between the destination and origin principles has been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature, but almost all analyses have been carried out in a setting of
perfectly competitive product markets.3 A benchmark result is that the destination
and origin principles are equivalent, if either exchange rates or producer prices are
fully ﬂexible, and if the commodity tax can be levied on all goods at the same rate
(see Lockwood, de Meza and Myles, 1994). Existing value-added taxes, however,
have zero or reduced tax rates for important categories of goods and services (e.g.
banking and insurance, foodstuﬀ, housing) so that VAT should be more realisti-
cally thought of as a selective commodity tax. In this case, tax diﬀerentials between
countries distort international consumption patterns when taxes are levied under
the destination principle, whereas international production patterns are distorted
when taxes are levied under the origin principle. By the production eﬃciency theo-
rem, this establishes a basic argument for consumption-based commodity taxation
(e.g. Frenkel, Razin and Sadka 1991). Furthermore, under the origin principle, non-
cooperative tax policies lead to tax rates being ineﬃciently low in at least one country
when goods produced in the trading countries are perfect substitutes (Mintz and
Tulkens 1986). Under the destination principle, in contrast, no ﬁscal externalities
2Empirical evidence for the U.S. shows that residents of states with high sales taxes are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to buy in the Internet (Goolsbee 2000). For the European Union, Nam, Parsche
and Schaden (2001) calculate, on the basis of national accounts statistics, that VAT evasion has
increased in eight out of ten selected member states during the time period 1994-1996.
3See Lockwood (2001) for a recent and thorough synthesis of the literature on the choice of tax
principle and the related issue of tax rate harmonization.
2are present when countries are too small to aﬀect world prices. Hence, in this setting
the non-cooperative equilibrium under the destination principle Pareto dominates
the outcome under the origin principle (Lockwood 2001, Propositions 1 and 2).4
In recent years, a few contributions have begun to analyze the choice of commodity
tax principle under conditions of imperfect competition, and have questioned the pol-
icy case for the destination regime. Using a duopoly model with a homogeneous good
traded in an integrated market, Keen and Lahiri (1998) have shown that consump-
tion taxes will be inferior to production taxes in a variety of scenarios under both
cooperative and non-cooperative tax setting. One particularly noteworthy result of
their analysis (Proposition 6) is that when countries are identical, non-cooperative
taxation under the destination principle causes eﬃciency losses, whereas tax com-
petition under the origin principle yields the ﬁrst best. Hauﬂer, Schjelderup and
St¨ ahler (2002) have introduced transport costs and market segmentation into this
model and have shown that the welfare comparison between the two tax regimes
becomes ambiguous in this case. For low levels of transport costs the origin principle
continues to dominate, but this ranking is turned around in favour of the destination
principle when transport costs become suﬃciently high.
Lockwood (2001, sec. 4 and 6) sets up a diﬀerent model of imperfect competition,
which combines imperfect substitutability of goods with proﬁt-making ﬁrms. As in
Keen and Lahiri (1998), ﬁrms can export into foreign markets, but are not allowed
to relocate abroad. In Lockwood’s model, taxes levied under either the destination
or the origin principle create international spillovers on the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms.
In this setting, a welfare comparison of the Nash equilibria under the two regimes
requires simulation methods and yields ambiguous results. Therefore, even though
the strong ﬁndings of Keen and Lahiri in favour of the origin principle are not
conﬁrmed in this framework, a general welfare argument for the destination principle
has also not been established so far under conditions of imperfect competition.
4Some caveats to this conclusion should be mentioned. First, production eﬃciency may not be
desirable from the perspective of world welfare maximization when the trading countries face sep-
arate budget constraints and lump-sum transfers between them are excluded (Keen and Wildasin
2000). Second, when large countries engage in tax competition, terms of trade eﬀects are present.
Then neither of the two tax principles Pareto dominates the other (Lockwood 1993).
3The present paper studies non-cooperative commodity taxation under destination
and origin regimes in a framework of monopolistic competition and product diﬀer-
entiation.5 This model, and its ‘economic geography’ extensions, have recently been
applied to a number of diﬀerent policy contexts including industrial policy (Flam and
Helpman 1987, Venables 1987), the provision of public infrastructure and regional
aid (Martin and Rogers 1995a, 1995b), capital and income tax competition (An-
dersson and Forslid 1999; Kind, Midelfart Knarvik and Schjelderup 2000; Baldwin
and Krugman 2000), environmental tax competition (Pﬂ¨ uger 2001), and the ﬁscal
eﬀects of regional integration (Ludema and Wooton 2000). An important advantage
of this model is that it can be extended to allow for the relocation decisions of in-
ternationally mobile ﬁrms. Furthermore, we are able to derive closed-form solutions
for all endogenous variables, making it easy to interpret the results obtained.
A striking result of our analysis is that non-cooperative tax policy under the des-
tination principle achieves the ﬁrst best, because the ﬁscal externalities associated
with international capital and ﬁrm mobility exactly oﬀset each other. A domestic
tax rise drives ﬁrms to the foreign country and raises foreign welfare by reducing
aggregate transport costs. At the same time, however, the tax also reduces the rents
that accrue to foreign capital owners. Under the origin principle, these eﬀects are also
present but there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign
price level which lead tax rates to depart from their Pareto optimal levels. Hence,
in direct contrast to the results of Keen and Lahiri (1998), the non-cooperative
tax equilibrium under the destination regime strictly dominates the tax equilibrium
under the origin principle.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2 we describe the symmetric monopolistic
competition model that underlies our analysis. Section 3 derives the optimal com-
modity tax rates in the benchmark case where taxes are set cooperatively. Section 4
analyzes non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination principle and
Section 5 carries out the same analysis for the origin principle. Section 6 discusses
several extensions of our basic model and Section 7 compares our results to those
derived in related literature. Section 8 concludes.
5For a synthesis of diﬀerent models of monopolistic competition, see Helpman and Krugman
(1985, Section III; 1989, Ch. 7).
42 The model
2.1 Consumption
We consider an open-economy version of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of mo-
nopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Krugman 1979, 1980) where each
variety of the diﬀerentiated good is produced using one unit of capital and a variable
amount of labour (see Flam and Helpman 1987). There are two identical countries,
home and foreign, the latter being denoted by an asterisk (¤). A typical consumer in
the home country maximizes the utility function U, which is deﬁned over a diﬀeren-
tiated good D produced in the monopolistically competitive sector, and an outside
numeraire good C produced under conditions of perfect competition. All goods can
be traded internationally. For the upper-tier utility function, we adopt a widely used
logarithmic and quasi-linear speciﬁcation (e.g. Dixit 1990: 31-34):
U = ® lnD + C; ® > 0: (1)
The diﬀerentiated good D consists of a large number of varieties. Dh is the home
country’s per capita demand for each of N domestic varieties and Df is the per
capita demand for N¤ varieties produced abroad. Each variety is produced by one
ﬁrm and varieties in each country are treated symmetrically, with ¾ denoting the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of diﬀerentiated goods. The substitution
elasticity is restricted to be greater than unity; this ensures that a solution exists













; ¾ > 1: (2)
The prices for home and foreign varieties are given by ph and pf, respectively. Trade
in the diﬀerentiated good is subject to transportation costs, which are captured by
multiplying the prices of imported varieties by a constant ¿ > 1. In contrast to the
usual speciﬁcation of Samuelsonian ‘iceberg’ transport costs, we view transportation
as a service that consumes real resources but enters the tax base of governments.6
6We thus think of transport costs in the original Von Th¨ unen sense, who took the cost of grain
transport to consist largely of the grain consumed by the horses pulling the wagon (cf. Fujita,
5The numeraire good C is freely traded, at no transport cost, and this ﬁxes the price
of this good at unity in both countries.
An ad valorem commodity tax is levied on the diﬀerentiated good under either the
destination principle (td) or the origin principle (to).7 Under the destination principle
the home country’s tax falls on the domestic consumption of all varieties of the
commodity bundle D, whereas under the origin principle the tax falls on the domestic
varieties produced for both the home and the foreign market. The commodity tax is
selective in that the numeraire commodity C remains untaxed.8 Denoting per capita
income under the destination and origin principles by Yk; k 2 fd;og, the budget
constraints under the two tax regimes are given by
(1 + td)[N ph Dh + N
¤ ¿ pf Df] + C = Yd; (3a)
(1 + to) N ph Dh + (1 + t
¤
o)N
¤ ¿ pf Df + C = Yo: (3b)
Introducing the dual price indices Pk, these budget constraints can be concisely
written as
Pk D + C = Yk 8 k 2 fd;og; (4)
where











N [(1 + to) ph]
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Maximizing (1) subject to (4) yields the demand functions for the aggregate com-
modity bundle D and the numeraire commodity C. Under the quasi-linear speciﬁ-
cation of utility, all income changes aﬀect only the demand for the numeraire good.
Krugman and Venables 1999, p. 59). If transport costs were of the strict iceberg form, no tax
revenues could be collected on this service. This makes the analysis considerably more complex,
as the overall level of transport costs (summed over both countries) will then be aﬀected by tax
policies. The analysis of this case is available from the authors upon request.
7Ad valorem taxes are the relevant form of general commodity taxation in practice. They are
also analytically convenient in the present model because they ensure that the price elasticity of
demand for a variety of good D is unaﬀected by taxes.
8This ensures that the destination and origin regimes have diﬀerent real eﬀects. If the numeraire
good is also taxed at the same rate, then the two regimes are equivalent under rather general
conditions, including the case of imperfect competition (Lockwood, de Meza and Myles 1994).
6Moreover, the logarithmic speciﬁcation in the utility function (1) implies a unit price
elasticity of aggregate demand for good D in our benchmark model.9 Hence,
D = ® P
¡1
k 8 k; (6)
C = Yk ¡ ® 8 k: (7)
At the second stage of budgeting consumers allocate their total expenditures for
the diﬀerentiated good between the diﬀerent varieties. Utility maximization with
respect to Dh under the constraint of a ﬁxed expenditure level for the bundle D
yields the demand for a typical domestic variety
Dh =
"
(1 + tk) ph
Pk
#¡¾
D = ®[(1 + tk) ph]
¡¾ P
¾¡1
k 8 k 2 fd;og: (8)
Analogously, the demand for a typical variety produced abroad is
Df =
"
(1 + tk) ¿ pf
Pk
#¡¾
D = ®[(1 + tk) ¿ pf]
¡¾ P
¾¡1
k 8 k 2 fd;og; (9)
where the foreign country’s tax rate t¤
o is relevant under the origin principle.
Substituting (6) and (7) back into (1) gives the indirect utility function
V (tk;t
¤






+ (Yk ¡ ®) 8 k 2 fd;og; (10)
which depends on tax rates in both countries.
2.2 Production and market equilibrium
There are L identical workers in the home country and each worker inelastically
supplies one unit of labour. The production of one unit of the numeraire good C
requires one unit of labour and no capital. These assumptions, and free trade in the
numeraire good, imply a wage rate of unity in both countries.10
In the diﬀerentiated goods sector, the production of each variety, Xh, requires one
unit of capital as a ﬁxed cost. In addition, each unit of a variety of good D is
9This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.
10Alternatively, one can assume that labour is perfectly mobile across countries (see Lockwood,
2001). In this case the price of the competitively produced numeraire commodity is ﬁxed at unity
in both countries, even if this good cannot be traded internationally.
7produced using one unit of labour so that variable costs are equal to unity. Including
transport costs as an indirect demand, market clearing for each domestic variety of
the diﬀerentiated good requires that





h is foreign per capita demand for a domestic variety of good D. The proﬁts
of a typical domestic ﬁrm are given by
¼ = (ph ¡ 1) L Dh + (p
¤
h ¡ 1) ¿ L
¤ D
¤
h ¡ R; (11)
where (ph ¡1) is the mark-up over wage costs (which equal one), p¤
h is the price for
a domestic variety sold abroad, and R is the rate of return for the capital input.
We make the Chamberlinian large group assumption, implying that each producer
perceives an elasticity of demand that is approximately equal to the elasticity of
substitution between any two varieties (¾). The proﬁt-maximizing output price at







Eq. (12) shows that producer prices are independent of the commodity tax rates in
our model, under either the destination or the origin regime. Substituting (12) back
into the proﬁt expression (11), using (8) and its foreign counterpart and L = L¤
from the assumption of identical endowments yields optimized proﬁts ˆ ¼.








































¤ = 0; (14)
where we have introduced ½ ´ ¿1¡¾ for brevity, with 0 < ½ < 1.
In a Chamberlinian long-run equilibrium, the rate of return to capital equals each
ﬁrm’s operating surplus. Capital is freely mobile internationally so that R = R¤.
Furthermore, under the assumptions made about production technologies the world
capital stock determines the number of ﬁrms operating in equilibrium and hence the
8total number of varieties of the diﬀerentiated good. We assume that each country is
endowed with K units of capital which are evenly distributed across the population.
The capital market clearing condition is then given by
N + N
¤ = 2K: (15)
The zero-proﬁt conditions (13)–(14) and the capital market clearing condition (15)
determine the three endogenous production variables N;N¤;R. Substituting in
from (5a) and the analogous equation for the price level in the foreign country,
and using ph = pf from the symmetry of the model, we obtain
Nd =
2K [(1 + t¤
d) ¡ ½(1 + td)]





2K [(1 + td) ¡ ½(1 + t¤
d)]




® L [(1 + td) + (1 + t¤
d)]
2 ¾ K (1 + td) (1 + t¤
d)
: (17)
In the symmetric equilibrium with td = t¤
d, it is easily veriﬁed from (16) that N =
N¤ = K. Similarly, with identical tax rates in both countries, eq. (17) reduces to
R =
® L
(1 + td) K ¾
: (18)
Intuitively, the consumption tax raises the price level and reduces aggregate demand
for the diﬀerentiated good. Since capital is employed only in this industry, its factor
price must fall in equilibrium.
In Appendix A we carry out the analogous computations for the origin principle.
While the expressions for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and the return to capital
are more complex under this regime, the symmetric equilibrium (with to = t¤
o) has
the same properties as the symmetric equilibrium with consumption-based taxes.
Finally, we derive per-capita income Y from the value of factor endowments and tax
revenue, which is redistributed to the individuals as a lump sum. The income of a
representative home individual, who supplies one unit of labour and K=L units of
capital is given by
Yk = 1 + R (K=L) + tk Tk 8 k 2 fd;og; (19)
where Tk denotes the per capita tax bases under the destination and origin regimes.
Under the destination principle, Td equals per capita expenditures for D-goods,
9valued at producer prices
Td = N ph Dh + N







where (6) has been used in the last step. Under the origin principle, To equals the
per capita value of domestic production











where the last step has used ¼h = (ph¡1)Xh¡R = 0 from (11) and (12). Note that
in (20a)–(20b) we have assumed that tax revenue can be collected on the transport
costs that are incurred by shipping goods abroad (see footnote 6).
3 Cooperative tax policy
Before we turn to the analysis of non-cooperative taxation, it is useful to derive the
optimal cooperative tax rate as a benchmark. Given that countries are identical in
our model, we can derive the cooperative tax choice by maximizing the joint welfare
of the two regions, as given by the sum of indirect utilities expressed in (10) and its
foreign counterpart. This ensures that tax policy internalizes all spillovers that exist
between the two countries.
In our symmetric model the distinction between the destination and the origin prin-
ciples is immaterial for the analysis of cooperative taxation, and both regimes must
yield the same tax rate. In the following, we derive the cooperative tax rate imple-
mented via the destination regime.11 The ﬁrst-order condition for the cooperatively

























From symmetry, the condition for the tax rate set by the foreign country is identical.
Turning ﬁrst to the eﬀects of a tax increase on the domestic and foreign price levels,
we diﬀerentiate (5a) and its foreign equivalent with respect to td and use @N=@td =
11The corresponding analysis of cooperative taxation under the origin principle is available upon
request.



























The ﬁrst term in (22) is the direct eﬀect of a destination-based tax increase on
the domestic price level. The remaining eﬀects in (22) and (23) give the price level
changes in the two countries induced by the relocation of ﬁrms. These are exactly
oﬀsetting so that the sum of eﬀects in (22) and (23) equals the direct eﬀect.
The changes in domestic and foreign income are given by diﬀerentiating (19) and





































In the home country, an increase in the destination tax raises the consumer price
of all diﬀerentiated goods and thus induces a negative demand response which re-
duces the tax base. In our benchmark model with logarithmic utility foreign aggre-
gate expenditures for good D, and hence the foreign tax base, are unaﬀected by
destination-based tax changes in the home country.





2 K ¾(1 + td)2 < 0: (26)
An increase in the domestic consumption tax makes the domestic market less prof-
itable for both domestic and foreign producers, and hence reduces the worldwide
rate of return to capital.
We substitute (25), (26) and (20a) into (24). Inserting the resulting expressions






11The cooperatively chosen subsidy in (27) corresponds to a ﬁrst-best allocation in the
present model.12 The consumer price for a domestic variety of the diﬀerentiated good
is (1+td)ph. Substituting in from (12) and (27) shows that the consumer price equals
unity and hence marginal cost. The price of imported varieties is ¿(1+td)pf, which
also equals total marginal costs of production and transportation. Summarizing this
result gives
Proposition 1: The optimal cooperative tax policy is a subsidy at rate 1=¾. This
policy achieves a ﬁrst-best allocation.
Intuitively, the cooperative policy subsidizes the output of all diﬀerentiated goods
with a rate that corresponds to the relative deviation of the producer price from
unit costs [¡(ph ¡ 1)=ph = 1=¾; cf. eq. (12)]. This ensures that the price distortion
arising from monopolistic competition is fully oﬀset and an eﬃcient allocation of
consumption between the diﬀerentiated good and the numeraire good is restored.
An increase in ¾ reduces the mark-up charged by the monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms; hence, it also reduces the need for a subsidy. In the extreme, as ¾ ! 1
producers of all varieties of bundle D behave in a perfectly competitive way and the
optimal subsidy is zero.
Proposition 1 can be related to a result in Keen and Lahiri (1998, Proposition 2,
last part) for their duopoly model with homogeneous products. According to their
analysis, a ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved under both the origin and the des-
tination basis when production eﬃciency requires only one ﬁrm to produce. But
when preferences are of the Dixit-Stiglitz type and technologies are characterized
by increasing returns to scale, then proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms will ensure that no
variety is produced by more than one ﬁrm (Helpman and Krugman 1985, Ch. 7).
Therefore, in our model of monopolistic competition, cooperative tax policy under
either tax regime will always lead to a Pareto eﬃcient outcome.
The ﬁrst-best optimum obtained in the cooperative case serves as a convenient
benchmark to identify potential ineﬃciencies from non-cooperative taxation under
the destination and origin principles. We now analyze the diﬀerent regimes in turn.
12It is straightforward to show that the same optimal tax formula is obtained under autarky.
124 Tax competition with destination-based taxes
We ﬁrst study non-cooperative tax policy under the destination principle. The core
question asked is whether national policy-makers have an incentive to pursue beggar-
thy-neighbour policies under this tax principle, leading to ineﬃcient commodity tax
choices in the resulting (symmetric) Nash equilibrium.
To gain an intuitive understanding for the externalities involved, we determine the
eﬀect that a domestic tax increase has on foreign welfare and evaluate this expression


















This is also the marginal eﬀect of a domestic tax change on world welfare, since
nationally optimal tax policy always ensures that @V=@td = 0. From the concavity
of (V +V ¤) in td we can then conclude that the non-cooperative tax rate exceeds the
Pareto optimal tax rate if @V ¤=@td < 0 (i.e. the net spillover is negative), whereas
the non-cooperative tax rate falls below the Pareto optimal tax rate if @V ¤=@td > 0
(the net spillover is positive).
Based on our computations in the last section, the only additional term that needs
to be determined is the tax-induced change in the number of ﬁrms operating in each
country. Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to td and using the symmetry of the model




¡K (1 + ½)
2 (1 + td) (1 ¡ ½)
< 0: (29)
This eﬀect shows that a tax increase in the home country leads some domestic ﬁrms
to leave the country and set up production abroad.14 The reason is that the domestic
tax increase raises the price index of diﬀerentiated goods in the home country and
makes the domestic market less proﬁtable, relative to the foreign market. Since
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the suggestion to proceed in this way. A similar
approach is followed in Pﬂ¨ uger (2001).
14It is seen from (29) that @N=@td is negatively related to transport costs and tends to inﬁnity
when these costs become arbitrarily small. (Note that ½ ´ ¿1¡¾ tends to zero when transport costs
tend to inﬁnity, but ½ ! 1 when transport costs are negligible.)
13aggregate transport costs borne by consumers are raised when the number of foreign-
based ﬁrms increases, this eﬀect causes policy-makers to perceive an extra cost of
taxation in an open economy with internationally mobile ﬁrms and costly trade.
Inserting (29) into (23) and substituting the resulting expression along with (24)–























Hence, the non-cooperative tax rate chosen under the destination principle is ﬁrst-
best, and it reproduces the optimal tax rate in the cooperative tax equilibrium!15
To interpret this surprising result we use a classiﬁcation of externalities similar to
that in Lockwood (2001) and distinguish between (i) private consumption spillovers,
(ii) public consumption spillovers, and (iii) rent spillovers.16 The ﬁrst term in the
squared bracket in (30) represents a positive private consumption spillover, as a
tax rise in the home country will induce some ﬁrms to relocate abroad, lowering
aggregate transport costs for foreign consumers [cf. eq. (29)]. The second term in
the squared bracket is a negative rent spillover. It arises because a tax increase in
the home country lowers the worldwide rate of return to (internationally mobile)
capital and thus shifts some of the tax burden on foreign capital owners. There is no
public consumption externality in our benchmark model since a tax rise under the
destination principle does not aﬀect the foreign tax base. Evaluated at the Pareto
optimal tax rate ˆ t, the positive private consumption spillover and the negative rent
spillover exactly oﬀset each other in their eﬀects on foreign welfare, leaving no net
strategic eﬀect for the home country. Due to symmetry, the same is true for the
foreign country.
Finally, note that both externalities present under the destination principle become













and then solve for td.
16Lockwood aggregates the private and public consumption externalities into a consumer price
spillover (2001: 289) and incorporates an additional producer price spillover (i.e., a terms of trade
eﬀect). The latter need not be considered here because producer prices are unaﬀected by taxes in
our monopolistic competition model [cf. eq. (12)].
14weaker when the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent varieties of good D
is increased. In the special case where ¾ ! 1, and hence the market structure
approaches that of perfect competition, both externalities disappear altogether. In-
tuitively, if all varieties of the diﬀerentiated good are perfect substitutes, then inter-
national trade in this good ceases in the presence of transport costs, and a domestic
tax increase has no eﬀect on foreign consumer prices. Moreover, rent income is zero
in the absence of a mark-up over production costs so that the rent spillover also
disappears. Our results under the destination principle are summarized in
Proposition 2: The non-cooperative tax equilibrium under the destination prin-
ciple is Pareto eﬃcient and tax rates are the same as in the cooperative equilibrium.
In Section 6, we will analyze whether this strong result continues to hold when
countries diﬀer with respect to population size, and when the upper-tier utility
function U(D;C) is generalized to allow for diﬀerent values of the own-price elasticity
of demand for the diﬀerentiated good.
5 Tax competition with origin-based taxes
Under the origin principle, the commodity tax falls on all domestically produced
varieties of the diﬀerentiated good. Hence, the tax directly aﬀects the proﬁtability
of ﬁrms in the home country. We proceed in the same way as in the previous section


























From (5b) and its foreign equivalent, the eﬀects of an origin-based tax change on

































Under the origin principle, an increase in the home country’s tax rate raises both the
domestic and the foreign price level by a direct eﬀect, with the weights depending
15on the proportion in which domestic varieties are consumed in the two countries.
The indirect price eﬀects caused by the relocation of ﬁrms [the second terms in (32)
and (33)] are again equal and of opposite sign. Hence the sum of eﬀects (@Po=@to +
@P ¤
o=@to) is the same as under the destination principle.
The change in the number of ﬁrms is obtained by diﬀerentiating (A.3) in the ap-




¡K [1 + 2½(2¾ ¡ 1) + ½2]
2 (1 + to) (1 ¡ ½)2 < 0 : (34)
A comparison with the corresponding equation under the destination principle
[eq. (29)] shows that the numerator in eq. (34) is larger and the denominator is
smaller than in (29). Hence, an equiproportionate tax change leads to a larger relo-
cation of ﬁrms under the origin regime as compared to the destination regime.
Next, the change in the return to capital under this tax regime is derived from





2 K ¾(1 + to)2 < 0: (35)
The eﬀect of a tax rise on the rate of return to capital is thus the same under
the origin and destination regimes [cf. eq. (26)]. This should not be surprising in a
symmetric model, since the change in the worldwide return to capital is determined
by the overall increase in the world price level for diﬀerentiated goods. As we have
seen above, the sum of the price level eﬀects in the two countries is the same for a
given increase in either the consumption or the production tax.
Finally, the eﬀect on the foreign country’s tax base T ¤
o is obtained by diﬀerentiating








(1 ¡ ½)2 > 0: (36)
Eq. (36) shows that a domestic tax increase has a positive eﬀect on the foreign
tax base. This eﬀect, which is here driven by the relocation of ﬁrms to the foreign
country, parallels a well-known property of competitive models of non-cooperative
commodity taxation under the origin principle (see, for example, Mintz and Tulkens
1986; Lockwood 2001, sec. 2.3).
16Substituting (34) into (33) and using the resulting expression along with (35)
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¡® ¾2 ½ (1 + ½)
(¾ ¡ 1)2 (1 ¡ ½)2 < 0: (37)
Hence, non-cooperative taxation under the origin principle leads to tax rates that
exceed their Pareto eﬃcient levels. To explain this result, we look at the three terms
collected in the square bracket in (37). The ﬁrst term is the private consumption
spillover, which is composed of two subeﬀects under the origin principle. As is seen
from (33), a rise in to has a positive direct eﬀect on P ¤
o through the increased
export prices of domestically produced varieties (an eﬀect that is absent under the
destination regime), and a negative indirect eﬀect through the relocation of ﬁrms to
the foreign country. The latter eﬀect dominates and a domestic tax increase leads
to a net decrease in the foreign price level and thus a positive eﬀect on foreign
welfare. The second bracketed term in (37) is a negative rent spillover, which is due
to the fall in foreign rent income. Hence, as under the destination principle, there are
counteracting externalities associated with the relocation of ﬁrms on the one hand
and the fall in the world interest rate on the other. Under the origin principle there
is also a public consumption spillover, however, which is given by the third bracketed
term in (37). This term has the same sign as t¤
o and is thus negative once evaluated
at the Pareto optimal subsidy ˆ t = ¡1=¾. Intuitively, the increase in the foreign tax
base caused by a rise in to implies that the foreign country pays out more subsidies,
which partially accrue to the home economy in the form of lower consumer prices.
Our model also allows to derive a closed-form solution for the optimal tax rate under
the origin principle. For this purpose we have to derive the change in the home





























17using To = ®=(1 + to) in the symmetric equilibrium17, and solving for to gives
ˆ to =
¡(1 ¡ ½)[(2¾ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ½) + 2¾2½]
¾f[2¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ½)](1 ¡ ½) + 4¾(¾ ¡ 1)½g
< 0: (39)
Hence, the non-cooperative tax rate chosen under the origin principle is always nega-
tive, but it is higher (i.e., the subsidy is smaller) than in the cooperative benchmark.
To see this, start from a prohibitively high level of transport costs (¿ ! 1 and hence
½ ! 0). In this case, the origin-based tax rate replicates the cooperative tax rate
ˆ t = ¡1=¾, which also equals the tax rate under autarky. In the opposite polar case
of zero transport costs (¿ = 1), the optimal production tax is ˆ to = 0. More generally,
diﬀerentiating (39) with respect to ¿ shows that the production tax rises monoton-
ically (i.e., the subsidy becomes smaller) when transport costs are reduced. This
implies that for any non-prohibitive level of transport costs the optimal production
tax will exceed its Pareto eﬃcient level.
We can again evaluate the non-cooperate tax rate under the origin principle when
the market structure approaches that of perfect competition (¾ ! 1). This implies
½ ! 0 and to approaches the Pareto eﬃcient level, which equals zero in this case.
As under the destination regime [cf. eq. (30)] all externalities also disappear under
the origin principle when commodity markets are perfectly competitive. We have
already given an explanation why the private consumption and rent spillovers are
zero in this case. Moreover, in the absence of a government revenue constraint the
Pareto optimal tax rate is zero and hence the public consumption spillover also
vanishes. This shows that the destination and origin regimes have diﬀerent eﬀects
in our model only when ﬁrms have some power to set prices above marginal cost.
Our results are summarized in
Proposition 3: For all ﬁnite levels of transport costs and substitution elasticities,
the non-cooperative tax equilibrium under the origin principle is not Pareto eﬃcient.
Tax rates are higher (subsidies are lower) than in the cooperative equilibrium.
17This is obtained by substituting (18) and N = K into (20b).
186 Extensions
In this section we discuss some extensions of our basic model. In particular, we are
concerned with the robustness of our ﬁnding that the ﬁscal externalities associated
with international ﬁrm and capital mobility are exactly oﬀsetting under the desti-
nation principle. First, we relax the assumption that countries are identical in all
respects. A popular setting in the tax competition literature is to have countries of
diﬀerent ‘size’, which dispose of diﬀerent absolute endowments of labour and capi-
tal, but have the same capital-labour ratio (see Bucovetsky 1991, Wilson 1991). It
is shown in Appendix B that the Nash equilibrium tax rates under the destination
principle continue to be ﬁrst best in this more general framework.
Intuitively, the country with the larger absolute endowment of both labour and
capital (say, the home country) will attract ﬁrms from the smaller country in equi-
librium [see eq. (A.6) in the appendix]. This is the familiar ‘home market eﬀect’
(Krugman 1980), which states that the larger market will be more proﬁtable in the
presence of transportation costs. However, even with a disproportionate number of
ﬁrms located in the home country, the size of all externalities associated with a
domestic tax increase depends only on the initial factor endowments of the home
country. On the one hand, a given change in the tax rate of the larger country will
lead to a larger drop in the return to capital, thus imposing a larger negative rent
spillover on the (small) foreign country [by eq. (A.7)]. On the other hand, the abso-
lute number of ﬁrm relocations will also rise [by eq. (A.7)], increasing the savings in
transportation costs for the foreign country, and hence the strength of the positive
private consumption spillover. Since both externalities are increased by the same
proportion, the net eﬀect is again zero and the non-cooperative equilibrium under
the destination principle continues to be Pareto eﬃcient.
Second, we generalize the upper-tier utility function U(C;D). Our results in the
previous sections have been derived under the assumption that utility is logarithmic
in the consumption of the diﬀerentiated good, and hence the own-price elasticity
of demand for this good is one in absolute value. A more general class of utility












which implies a price elasticity of demand equal to (¡"). The demand functions for
domestic and foreign varieties are
Dh = ®
" [ph(1 + tk)]
¡¾ P
(¾¡")
k ; Df = ®
" [¿pf(1 + tk)]
¡¾ P
(¾¡")
k ; k 2 fd;og;
where Pk is the price level of the diﬀerentiated good and p = ph = pf is the proﬁt-
maximizing price chosen by domestic and foreign producers. Following Helpman and
Krugman, 1989: 141) we assume that ¾ > ", i.e. the substitution elasticity between
any two varieties of good D is larger than the overall price elasticity of demand.
This ensures that the demand for an individual variety depends positively on the
overall price index Pk.
For this extended model the overall eﬀect on foreign welfare of a domestic tax change




























Hence, our result that non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination
principle yields a Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium carries over to the more general setting
where the price elasticity of demand for diﬀerentiated goods is variable.
To give an intuition for this result, compare the more general expression (41) with
eq. (30) derived in our benchmark setting with logarithmic utility. There are two
changes. On the one hand, eq. (41) contains an additional public consumption
spillover, which is given by the third term in the square bracket. This term re-
duces to zero in the special case where " = 1. Intuitively, the change in the foreign
price level caused by the tax-induced relocation of ﬁrms will change aggregate for-
eign expenditures, and hence the foreign tax base, whenever " 6= 1. If, for example,
foreign demand is price elastic (" > 1), then the fall in P ¤
d caused by a domestic
tax increase will increase foreign expenditures for good D and increase the foreign
20tax base. But since the foreign country subsidizes consumption in the optimum, the
larger tax base implies a negative eﬀect on tax revenues and hence income in the
foreign country. This is the same eﬀect that we have already encountered in our
analysis of the origin principle (Section 5). For " > 1 this eﬀect tends raise non-
cooperatively chosen tax rates under the destination principle above their Pareto
eﬃcient levels (subsidies are ‘too low’). However, the positive private consumption
spillover [the ﬁrst eﬀect in (41)] also increases if price elasticities are high. Intuitively,
a high value of " leads to a large drop in the home country’s demand for good D
following a consumption tax increase and thus causes a strong negative eﬀect on the
proﬁtability of the domestic market. This in turn leads to a stronger relocation of
ﬁrms to the foreign market and a more pronounced fall in the foreign price level for
diﬀerentiated goods. It turns out that these two counteracting eﬀects of a variation
in " are exactly oﬀsetting, so that non-cooperative tax rates under the destination
principle remain at their Pareto optimal levels.
Finally, it is worthwhile to ask whether the favourable characteristics of the des-
tination principle carry over to the monopolistic competition model of Krugman
(1980), where labour is the only factor of production and the total number of ﬁrms
operating in both countries is endogenous rather than ﬁxed. Despite these changes
in the model, tax policies will aﬀect the relative proﬁtability of the domestic and
the foreign market for diﬀerentiated goods in similar ways. To be sure, the negative
rent spillover operating through a reduction in the foreign country’s capital income
is no longer present in Krugman’s setting. However, another negative externality
arises from a domestic consumption tax, as the tax decreases the proﬁtability of
the home country’s market and thus reduces the overall number of varieties pro-
duced. The private consumption spillovers under both the destination and origin
principles are not qualitatively aﬀected by this modiﬁcation of the model. Hence
the endogenous variety version of the monopolistic competition model is likely to
produce qualitatively very similar results as the model analyzed above.
217 Discussion and related literature
The main conclusion from our analysis is that the non-cooperative tax equilibrium
under the destination principle is Pareto eﬃcient, and dominates the non-cooperative
equilibrium under the origin principle (Propositions 2 and 3). Our analysis in the
previous section has also shown that this result is robust to at least some exten-
sions of our benchmark model. These ﬁndings are in sharp contrast to the results
that Keen and Lahiri (1998, Proposition 6) have obtained in a setting of homo-
geneous commodities and international duopoly. In their analysis, non-cooperative
taxes levied under the origin principle yield the ﬁrst-best, but the same is not true
if taxes are levied under the destination principle.
The explanation for this striking contrast lies in the diﬀerent assumptions made
about the imperfectly competitive market structure. In the homogeneous duopoly
model, strategic motives are directed primarily at the distribution of ﬁrms’ prof-
its. Under the origin principle, each country has an incentive to subsidize domestic
production, in order to shift proﬁts to the domestic ﬁrm.18 This strategic motive is
compatible with the goal to correct the domestic production ineﬃciency via a sub-
sidy and is responsible for the Pareto optimality of origin-based commodity taxation.
Under the destination principle, in contrast, a subsidy to domestic consumption will
increase the proﬁts earned by the foreign ﬁrm in the home market. Hence, strategic
considerations conﬂict with domestic production eﬃciency, leading to ineﬃcient tax
rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium. For this reason, the ability to act directly
on ﬁrms’ output decisions is a distinct potential advantage of the origin principle in
the duopoly model (Keen and Lahiri 1998, p. 343).
In our model of monopolistic competition producer prices are unaﬀected by taxes in
equilibrium [eq. (12)] so that the entire burden of either destination- or origin-based
taxes falls on consumers. Under the destination principle, the externalities associated
with international ﬁrm and capital mobility are exactly oﬀsetting so that tax policy
is targeted exclusively at the domestic ineﬃciency resulting from imperfect com-
18This motive is familiar from the literature on strategic trade policy (Brander and Spencer
1985). Janeba (1998) has shown, however, that the eﬀect depends crucially on the assumption that
ﬁrms cannot relocate internationally.
22petition. Under the origin principle, however, two additional spillovers are present.
First, an origin-based tax falls partly on foreign consumers who cannot avoid the
tax-induced increase in import prices because imported varieties are not produced
domestically. Second, when production is subsidized in equilibrium, each country
has an incentive to reduce the domestic subsidy as this will cause ﬁrms to locate in
the foreign country and thus reduces domestic subsidy payments at the expense of
foreigners. These two additional motives operating under the origin principle thus
work in the same direction in our model, and conﬂict with the goal to counteract
the domestic distortion by means of a subsidy.
Finally, it is straightforward to link our results to the analysis of imperfectly com-
petitive markets and diﬀerentiated products in Lockwood (2001, Sections 4 and 6).
In Lockwood’s analysis taxes levied under the destination principle cause a negative
externality on the foreign country by aﬀecting the proﬁts of its ﬁrms. This eﬀect cor-
responds to the negative spillover that destination-based taxes have in the present
model on the rate of return to capital earned by foreigners. However, there is no
oﬀsetting positive externality in Lockwood’s model, because ﬁrms are not allowed
to relocate internationally. Therefore non-cooperative tax policy under the destina-
tion principle leads to a Pareto eﬃcient allocation in the present model, but not in
Lockwood’s analysis. Under the origin principle, the additional negative externality
on the foreign price level is also present in Lockwood’s framework (and labelled a
‘consumer price spillover’ there). This is because the two analyses share the common
assumption that goods produced at home and abroad are imperfect substitutes.
8 Conclusions
It is widely acknowledged that taxing international trade in the country of consump-
tion is welfare superior to production-based taxation when commodity markets are
perfectly competitive. However, as Keen and Lahiri (1998) have recently argued from
a model with homogeneous products, no transport costs, and duopoly competition
between ﬁrms, this ranking may be turned around in favour of the origin principle
if there is imperfect competition in product markets. This caveat is important from
a policy perspective because economic integration and the emergence of new tech-
23nologies – the Internet, in particular – make it more costly to enforce the taxation
of goods and services in the country of consumption.
In the present paper we have incorporated the policy question raised by Keen and
Lahiri (1998) into an established new trade model with diﬀerentiated products,
transport costs, and international mobility of capital and ﬁrms (Flam and Help-
man, 1987). This framework incorporates a number of channels by which tax poli-
cies in one country can aﬀect welfare in neighbouring jurisdictions, thus highlighting
the potential sources for globally ineﬃcient outcomes when tax rates are set non-
cooperatively. Interestingly, despite the complexity of the framework used, a rather
robust case for destination-based commodity taxation has emerged from our anal-
ysis. While ﬁscal externalities do exist under this regime, the incentive to attract
internationally mobile ﬁrms on the one hand and to tax the rents earned by foreign
investors on the other tend to be oﬀsetting – not only qualitatively, but also quan-
titatively. Starting from a symmetric benchmark model with logarithmic utility, we
have shown that this result is robust to the introduction of diﬀerences in country
‘size’, and it also generalizes to utility functions that exhibit a variable own-price
elasticity of demand. Under the origin principle, in contrast, there are additional
externalities on the foreign tax base and on foreign import prices that lead the non-
cooperative tax equilibrium under this tax regime away from the Pareto eﬃcient
benchmark.
In sum, our analysis has identiﬁed a setting of imperfect competition where non-
cooperative taxation under the destination principle unambiguously dominates the
outcome under the origin principle. This result should not be overemphasized be-
cause our analysis has maintained a number of simplifying assumptions, such as
the absence of a government revenue constraint and the symmetry of countries and
ﬁrms in all structural respects. At the very least, however, our monopolistic compe-
tition model with internationally mobile ﬁrms has demonstrated that the existence
of imperfect competition in product markets does not lead to a general argument
in favour of origin-based commodity taxes. Given the largely undisputed preference
for the destination principle in perfectly competitive markets, it may then indeed
be worth to accept some administrative and compliance costs in order to maintain
this principle as a general scheme for taxing international trade.
24Appendix
A. Market equilibrium under the origin principle








































¤ = 0: (A.2)
The zero-proﬁt conditions (A.1)–(A.2) and the capital market clearing condition (15)
are substituted in (5b) and its foreign equivalent. Introducing ° ´ (1+to)¾(1+t¤
o)¾,
this yields for the number of ﬁrms in the home country
No =
2K (1 + t¤
o) (1 + to)¾ [(1 + ½2)(1 + t¤
o)¾ ¡ 2½(1 + to)¾]
° (1 + ½2) [(1 + to) + (1 + t¤
o)] ¡ 2½[(1 + to) (1 + t¤
o)2¾ + (1 + t¤
o) (1 + to)2¾]
:
(A.3)
For the rate of return to capital under the origin principle, we get
Ro =
®Lf° (1 + ½2) [(1 + to)¡1 + (1 + t¤
o)¡1] ¡ 2½[(1 + to)2¾¡1 + (1 + t¤
o)2¾¡1]g
2 ¾ K [(1 + to)¾ ¡ ½(1 + t¤
o)¾] [(1 + t¤
o)¾ ¡ ½(1 + to)¾]
:
(A.4)
Setting to = t¤
o in (A.3) gives N = K, whereas (A.4) then reduces to eq. (18) in the
text.
25B. Diﬀerences in absolute factor endowments
With diﬀerent factor endowments in the two countries, and the destination principle



















¤ = K + K
¤: (A.5)
For the endogenous production variables N;N¤;R, this yields
N =
(K + K¤)[L(1 + t¤
d) ¡ L¤½(1 + td)]
(1 ¡ ½)[L(1 + t¤
d) + L¤(1 + td)]
; N
¤ =
(K + K¤)[L¤(1 + td) ¡ L½(1 + t¤
d)]
(1 ¡ ½)[L(1 + t¤
d) + L¤(1 + td)]
R =
® [L(1 + t¤
d) + L¤(1 + td)]
¾(K + K¤)(1 + td) (1 + t¤
d)
: (A.6)
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Substituting (A.8) in the ﬁrst-order condition for the domestic tax rate, proceeding
analogously for the foreign country and using (K=L) = (K¤=L¤) when relative factor









































Substituting td = t¤
d = ¡1=¾ in (A.9) shows that this solves the set of equations.
26C. Variable price elasticity of demand for diﬀerentiated goods
We use the generalized utility function with derived demand functions (40) and
proceed in the same way as in sections 3 and 4 to evaluate the net eﬀect of a
























This more general model does not allow to derive closed-form solutions for the
world interest rate and the number of ﬁrms in each country. Instead, the variables

























The eﬀect of a change in td on the number of ﬁrms is obtained by equating the RHS





2 (1 + td)
(1 ¡ ¾)
(" ¡ ¾)
K (1 + ½)
(1 ¡ ½)
:
To derive the change in R, we have to make use of both equations (A.11) and (A.12),
since they imply diﬀerent responses to a tax change. Adding up (A.11) and (A.12),
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2 ¾(1 + td)"+1 [K(1 + ½)]("¡¾)=(1¡¾) : (A.13)
The eﬀects on the foreign price level P ¤
d and the foreign tax base T ¤



















2 (1 + td)"+1 (¾ ¡ ")
[K(1 + ½)]
(1¡")
(1¡¾) [¡1 + "]: (A.15)
It is easily checked that for " = 1 the expressions in (A.13)–(A.15) reduce to their
respective values in the main text [see eqs. (23), (25), (26) and (29)].
Substituting (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.10), using P ¤
d = (1 + t¤
d) p [K(1 +
½)]1=(1¡¾) and evaluating at td = ˆ t = ¡1=¾ yields equation (41) in the main text.
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